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ADDRESSING UTAH’S SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE
Tyler B. Bugden*
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 2011, thirteen-year-old middle school student F.M. was removed
from his physical education class for generating fake burps that “made the other
students laugh and hampered class proceedings.”1 Ms. Mines-Hornbeck, the
middle school physical education teacher, requested assistance from the School
Resource Officer (“SRO”), Officer Arthur Acosta, who arrested F.M. “for
interfering with the educational process.”2 For this offense, Officer Acosta
searched, handcuffed, and drove F.M. in a patrol car to the juvenile detention
center where F.M. was booked and detained.3 The school suspended F.M. “for the
remainder of the 2010–11 school year.”4
This scenario is symptomatic of a nationwide trend, commonly referred to as
the School to Prison Pipeline (“STPP”), in which “alarming numbers of young
people are suspended, expelled, or even arrested for relatively minor
transgressions.”5 Former Attorney General Eric Holder explained that the STPP
produces “high out-of-school suspension rates” causing “lower-than-average
graduation rates,” making students “feel unwelcome in their own
schools. . . . [D]isrupt[ing] the learning process,” and having “lasting negative
effects on the long-term well-being of our young people—increasing their
likelihood of future contact with juvenile and criminal justice systems.”6
Alarmingly, Holder indicated that the STPP targets “students of color and those
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1
A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1129–30 (10th Cir. 2016).
2
Id.; see also N.M. STAT ANN. § 30-20-13(D) (2011) (prohibiting interference “with
the educational process of any public or private school”).
3
Holmes, 830 F.3d at 1130.
4
Id.
5
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Speech at Frederick Douglass High
School (Jan. 8, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holderdelivers-remarks-department-justice-and-department-education
[https://perma.cc/S7BNNEZP].
6
Id. For a groundbreaking and thorough discussion on how America’s criminal
justice system has perpetuated a racial caste system, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 2–19 (2012).
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with disabilities,” giving them “different and more severe punishments than their
peers.”7
In 2016, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) published its report, Schoolto-Prison Pipeline: Preliminary Report, documenting the nationwide presence of
the STPP and its disproportionate effects on students of color, students with
disabilities, and LGBTQ-identifying students.8 Among many other contributors to
the STPP, the report highlighted the negative role that SROs have played in
criminalizing student behavior and funneling students from the classroom to the
courtroom.9 The ABA’s Preliminary Report also points to implicit bias as a
contributing factor, and highlights how the “limited constitutional rights” of
students in school is a “law-related cause” of the STPP.10
Utah is not immune from these problems.11 In 2014, the Public Policy Clinic
at S.J. Quinney College of Law released its study, From Fingerpaint to
Fingerprints: The School to Prison Pipeline in Utah, exposing the STPP in Utah’s
public schools.12 The report warns that many of Utah’s school districts have
“overly subjective and harsh disciplinary policies that permit suspension . . . for
vague offenses,” and Utah’s children of color are disproportionately disciplined
and referred to law enforcement for these offenses.13

7

Holder, supra note 5.
SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: PRELIMINARY REPORT 10–11 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MX8-23KU].
9
Id. at 50–54.
10
Id. at 50, 54–56 (“Other law-related causes discussed in somewhat less detail
include the impact of zero tolerance policies, the limited constitutional rights of students in
school, low academic achievement, and high stakes testing.”); see also Jason P. Nance,
Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 936–40
(2016) (explaining how students’ limited constitutional protections at school contribute to
the school to prison pipeline).
11
See JORDIN ALBERS ET AL., UNIV. OF UTAH, FROM FINGERPAINT TO FINGERPRINTS:
THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE IN UTAH 5–15 (2014), https://www.nawj.org/uploads/pdf
/conferences/CLE/Fingerpaint%20to%20Fingerprint%20School%20to%20Prison_Pipeline
%20in%20Utah.pdf [https://perma.cc/MG4L-2GEZ] (revealing how the STPP operates in
Utah by analyzing suspension data); UTAH JUVENILE JUSTICE WORKING GRP., FINAL
REPORT 1 (2016), http://uacnet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utah-Juvenile-JusticeWorking-Group-Final-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GS8-W7AH] [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT] (demonstrating how Utah’s Juvenile Justice System suffers from bias, abuse of
discretion, and disparate outcomes); VANESSA WALSH, UNIV. OF UTAH, DISPARITIES IN
DISCIPLINE: A LOOK AT SCHOOL DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS FOR UTAH’S AMERICAN INDIAN
STUDENTS 3–5 (2015) (showing that American Indian students, “the smallest student
demographic in the state . . . was the most frequently expelled, referred to law enforcement,
and arrested for school related incidents.”).
12
ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
13
Id. at 3; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1–2, 6–7, 9–10.
8
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In 2016, the Utah Juvenile Justice Working Group (“Working Group”)
published its findings from a yearlong “data-driven assessment of the Utah
juvenile justice system,” highlighting many harms of Utah’s STPP.14 The Working
Group’s Final Report revealed widespread problems with Utah’s juvenile justice
system, ranging from “[d]isparities based upon race and geography” to a lack of
“[a]ffordable, accessible” evidence-based diversion programs to help rehabilitate
youth offenders.15
To address the causes and the harmful effects of the STPP, analysts suggest:
expanding the legal protections for juveniles;16 refraining from using SROs for
disciplinary issues;17 clearly distinguishing educator and administrator disciplinary
responsibilities from SRO responsibilities;18 retraining SROs to better understand
the effects of the STPP on youth and how to work with diverse youth
populations;19 adopting restorative justice practices and other evidence-based
alternatives to the juvenile justice system;20 and reforming the discretionary power
of state actors to cite, refer, and sentence youth within the juvenile justice system.21
14

FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
Id. at 1–2.
16
See id. at 15; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12; Developments in the Law–
Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1763–69 (2015) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment
protections afforded students should be modified); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform:
An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1236 (1970) (arguing that there will be
no revolution in juvenile justice until juveniles are granted the right to counsel); cf. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967) (“Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that
unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for
principle and procedure.”).
17
See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 20; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at
12–13; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, EDUCATION UNDER ARREST: THE CASE AGAINST
POLICE IN SCHOOLS 31 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/37UQ-P589].
18
See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13; MOISES PROSPERO, DMC EVIDENCEBASED, BEST PRACTICES INTERVENTION REPORT 6 (2014), https://www.nttac.org/views/
docs/dmccasp/Utah_DMC_Best_Practices_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBL6-7248].
19
See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9;
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 32; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7;
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.
20
See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 6, 22; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–13;
PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13. For a discussion
on restorative justice, see infra Part B.2.(a).
21
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–21; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at
13. See generally Sacha M. Coupet, What To Do With the Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The
Role of Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the
Juvenile Justice System, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1341–46 (2000) (arguing for guiding
discretion towards the use of individualized, restorative justice based justice for youth
offenders); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of
Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 436–
61 (2013) (arguing that reforming prosecutorial decision-making in the juvenile justice
system could reduce the racial disparities in the juvenile justice system).
15
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In response to the alarming evidence of Utah’s STPP, Utah passed a number
of laws implementing some of these recommendations.22 In 2016, Utah passed the
“School Resource Officers” Bill (“SRO Law”) that requires school districts and
police departments to formally define the role of SROs in schools, and requires
SROs to receive training specific to their job as school resource officers.23 In 2017,
Utah passed S.B. 134, “Indigent Defense Commission Amendments,” suggesting
that counsel must be provided “at all stages” for “[i]ndigent parties in juvenile
delinquency and child welfare proceedings,”24 and H.B. 239, “Juvenile Justice
Amendments,” guiding the exercise of discretion throughout the juvenile justice
system with the use of standards and procedures, the limitation of punitive options,
and the expansion of evidence-based rehabilitative services.25
This Note will evaluate how these reforms address Utah’s STPP. Part A
discusses how students’ limited constitutional rights, school discipline policies,
and untrained SROs with undefined roles contribute to the STPP in Utah. Part B
outlines how these reforms address the causes and effects of Utah’s STPP, and
argues that while they are productive, they fail to address the bias and abuse of
discretion that contribute to, as well as the disparate outcomes manifested in,
Utah’s STPP. This Note argues that Utah’s existing network of restorative justice
youth courts should be used to curtail the causes and effects of Utah’s STPP. Part
C proposes additional measures that Utah should take to address the STPP.
A. Student Rights, Policing Schools, and the School to Prison Pipeline
In an attempt to ensure our public schools are safe, school districts have
implemented zero tolerance policies, courts have weakened students’ constitutional
rights, teachers have been given broad authority to discipline students, and SROs
have been injected into our public schools without training or clearly defined
responsibilities. The practical effect of these measures is the STPP—the over
criminalization of problematic student behavior.
1. Student Rights Are Limited in Public Schools
Although the Supreme Court has maintained that students do not “shed their
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,”26 Supreme Court jurisprudence
and case law from around the nation suggest that students in schools have limited

22

See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-1603, 1604 (2016); H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen.
Sess. (Utah 2017); S.B. 134, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).
23
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11-1603, 1604 (2016).
24
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-804 (2016); S.B. 134, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah
2017).
25
H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).
26
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969)
(holding that prohibiting students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam
war violated their First Amendment rights).
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constitutional rights.27 Focused on efficiency in administrative decision-making
aimed at preserving “a safe environment conducive to education in the public
schools,” courts have weakened students’ privacy and due process rights while
expanding the discretionary power of school officials.28 The tension in America’s
juvenile justice system between the constitutional rights of juveniles and the parens
patriae29 power of the state to train juveniles is manifest in the STPP.30
(a) Zero Tolerance Policies
After the horrific shootings at Columbine High School in 1999, “moral panic”
ensued, causing school districts from around the nation to implement zero
tolerance policies in an effort to secure their schools.31 Developed from the policies
behind the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1994, aimed at keeping guns out of
schools, zero tolerance policies called for “automatic discipline” every time a
student committed a prohibited behavior, whether intentional or not.32 Zero
tolerance policies stripped school administrators of discretion in discipline

27

Nance, supra note 10, at 936–40 (explaining that students have limited due process
and privacy rights in schools).
28
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332–33 n.2, 341 (1985) (“We join the majority
of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the
privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators
for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the
requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the
search has violated or is violating the law.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582 (1975)
(holding that while students have a property right in their education, school administrators
considering suspending students for misbehavior meet due process requirements when they
provide notice by telling the student what they did wrong and provide a hearing by giving
the student a chance to explain her side of the story before suspending the student); see also
Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1275 (D. Utah 1999), aff’d, 3 F. App’x 905 (10th
Cir. 2001) (discussing what process is due to students who claim an injury to their
reputation).
29
The paternalistic parens patriae doctrine understands that the state as the sovereign
should care for “persons under a legal disability . . . who cannot take care of themselves.”
Coupet, supra note 21, at 1308 (citations omitted).
30
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); Illinois ex rel. O’Connell v.
Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 286–87 (1870); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104, 109 (1909). The paradox that “juveniles are different” informs this tension. See
Coupet, supra note 21, at 1306. While our justice system has come to understand that
juveniles are entitled to many of the same constitutional rights as adults, it has also come to
understand that juveniles should not be treated the same as adults for purposes of
sentencing. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 39–
58 (1967).
31
Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime
Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 540–41 (2013).
32
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 24.
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practices.33 In practice, these zero tolerance policies lead to a “one strike and
you’re out” discipline regime where students were automatically suspended or
expelled for behaviors that “previously would have been dealt with through afterschool detentions, withdrawal of privileges, counseling, mediation,” or other
methods that did not automatically remove a student from the classroom.34
Three common goals behind the implementation of zero tolerance policies
are: deterring bad behavior, incapacitating dangerous students, and maintaining
consistency in punishment between members of different racial groups.35
Unfortunately, “[d]ata indicates that harsh discipline and zero tolerance have
resulted in the exclusion of more students without actually deterring or improving
student behavior.”36 Zero tolerance policies result in more discipline, causing more
students to be excluded from school and raising the rate of re-offense for students
punished under zero tolerance policies.37 Additionally, the practical effect of zero
tolerance policies is that minorities are disproportionately referred “for subjective
misbehavior, like noise, disruption, and disrespect.”38 These zero tolerance policies
contribute to the disproportionate effect of the STPP on students of color,39
students with disabilities,40 and, some argue, LGBTQ students.41
Zero tolerance policies have not worked as intended.42 Instead, they fuel the
STPP.43 Critics of zero tolerance policies also argue that they violate students’
33

Id. (“A zero tolerance approach limited discretion, though research eventually
revealed that discretion continued and the approach was not especially effective.”).
34
Eric Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re Out? Constitutional
Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 65, 68–69
(2003).
35
Id. at 75–87.
36
Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 823, 838 (2015).
37
Id. at 838–39; see also A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1138–41, 1152 (10th Cir.
2016) (holding that a SRO had probable cause to arrest, handcuff, and detain a student for
burping in class, and the SRO was entitled to qualified immunity).
38
Black, supra note 36, at 840.
39
Nance, supra note 10, at 957 (discussing how the U.S. Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights Data Collection demonstrates the disproportionate impact that zero
tolerance policies have had on African American students).
40
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARV. UNIV.,
OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND
SCHOOL DISCIPLINE POLICIES 9 (2000), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k12-education/school-discipline/opportunities-suspended-the-devastating-consequences-ofzero-tolerance-and-school-discipline-policies/crp-opportunities-suspended-zero-tolerance2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAN8-KDU7].
41
Elizabethe C. Payne & Melissa J. Smith, LGBTQ Bullying: Zero Tolerance Is Not
the Answer, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
elizabethe-c-payne/lgbtq-bullying-zero-toler_b_8307222.html
[https://perma.cc/VVT2YWWA].
42
Holder, supra note 5 (discussing how the zero tolerance policies have not served
their purpose, but have contributed to juvenile incarceration); U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE &
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., JOINT “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTER (Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter DEAR

2017]

UTAH’S SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE

1067

substantive and procedural due process rights, and should be invalidated because
they automatically impose punishment without evaluating individualized concerns.
44
Few courts have invalidated zero tolerance policies on the constitutional grounds
that mandatory suspension or expulsion provisions are not “rationally related to
any legitimate state interest.”45 Instead, where a student’s rights are unclear,
discipline practices have been protected, and school administrators have been
granted qualified immunity.46
Until advocates for students who suffer the consequences of zero tolerance
policies can successfully invalidate those policies on constitutional grounds,
students will shed their constitutional right at the schoolhouse gate, making them
much more vulnerable to the STPP.47
(b) Students’ Limited Due Process Rights at School
Courts have limited the procedural and substantive due process rights of
students at school by “reducing disciplinary hearings to a sham” that are
“hardly . . . sufficient to protect . . . against deprivation by pretext.”48
In Goss v. Lopez,49 the Supreme Court held that students have a legitimate
property interest in their education.50 The Goss court explained that this “property
COLLEAGUE] (explaining that current discipline policies have been discriminatory in
nature, federal law prohibits “discriminating in the administration of student discipline,”
and making recommendations for better school discipline practices).
43
Holder, supra note 5; DEAR COLLEAGUE, supra note 42 (“Studies have suggested a
correlation between exclusionary discipline policies and practices and an array of serious
educational, economic, and social problems, including school avoidance and diminished
educational engagement; decreased academic achievement; increased behavior problems;
increased likelihood of dropping out; substance abuse; and involvement with juvenile
justice systems.”); REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 24–40 (evaluating data to explain
how zero tolerance policies have contributed to the school to prison pipeline).
44
Black, supra note 36, at 900 (arguing that the mandatory imposition of penalties
under zero tolerance regimes violates substantive and procedural due process rights
because “due process prohibits decision-makers from deciding students’ fates in advance,
and requires that they listen to what the students say, deliberate the facts, and determine
whether further information is necessary before making a decision.”).
45
Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2000).
46
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 378 (2009).
47
But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(maintaining that students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
gate.”).
48
Black, supra note 36, at 855 (quoting J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Goss v. Lopez: The
Supreme Court as School Superintendent, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 25, 30 (1975)); Nance, supra
note 10, at 939–40.
49
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
50
Id. at 574 (holding that students have a “legitimate entitlement to a public education
as a property interest”); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(explaining that education, “where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms.”).
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interest” is protected by the “Due Process Clause and . . . may not be taken away
for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that
Clause.”51 The Goss court explained that a student is deprived of his property
interest in education when he is suspended without due process’s “rudimentary
precautions” of notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to present his side of the
story.52 These must be afforded the student to safeguard against “unfair or
mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.”53
In applying this rule, the Goss court held that notice and the hearing can occur
simultaneously; the hearing can be an informal discussion with the student and the
student must “be told what he is accused of doing.”54 However, the court provided
that there are some situations “in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted
upon.”55 The Goss court explained that when schools believe a student’s “presence
poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting
the academic process,” that student may be removed immediately without notice or
a hearing.56
This exception to the due process requirements imposed by the court
effectively permits any school official to extrajudicially determine that a student is
not due the “rudimentary precautions” of notice, hearing, and an opportunity to
present his side of the story before suspension or expulsion. Even if the school
officials grant students notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to be heard, these
proceedings do not need to be “deliberative, collaborative, or aimed at accuracy,
justice, or helping the student.”57 Instead, these proceedings become a sham, or a
“routine hoop through which a school must jump to produce a favored result.”58
The minimal due process protections afforded students, the least powerful party in
the student-administrator dynamic, are too weak to protect students from being
funneled into the STPP.
(c) Students’ Limited Privacy Rights at School
Students’ privacy rights are weakened the moment they enter the
schoolhouse.59 In an effort to “promote safety and discipline within schools,”
courts have “weakened students’ Fourth Amendment rights” in four main ways.60
First, the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Jersey v. T.L.O.61 weakened
students’ reasonable expectation of privacy when at the schoolhouse.62 The T.L.O.
51

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
Id. at 581.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 582.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 582–83.
57
Nance, supra note 10, at 939–40.
58
Id.; Black, supra note 36, at 855.
59
See Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1748–54.
60
Nance, supra note 10, at 937.
61
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
52
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decision made it so that school officials do not have to obtain a warrant or probable
cause before conducting a search.63
Second, in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottowatomie County v. Earls,64 the Supreme Court held that schools do not need
individualized suspicion to conduct invasive drug tests on students involved in the
school’s extracurricular activities.65 The Earls court found the mandatory drug
tests reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “special needs” analysis because the
school district’s interest in preventing and deterring drug use outweighed the
invasiveness of the drug testing requirement.66 The Earls court explained that it
applied the “special needs” analysis where a search does not need to be supported
by probable cause, because the “probable-cause requirement” is impracticable in
public schools, where “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different . . . than
elsewhere.”67 Instead of requiring school administrators to proffer probable cause
before searching a student, the Supreme Court lowered the standard to reasonable
suspicion, explaining that the threshold inquiry for this standard is whether there is
a “moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.”68
Third, courts have permitted schools to “rely on intense surveillance methods
to maintain order and control” at school.69 Many schools are permitted “to use
metal detectors, search through students’ lockers, monitor students with
surveillance cameras, and conduct random drug testing on students.”70
Fourth, although they may be subject to criminal penalties, students are not
guaranteed the same protections afforded in criminal procedure.71 In T.L.O, the
assistant vice principal conducted a search of a student’s purse after someone
reported that the student was smoking cigarettes in the bathroom.72 During the
search of the student’s purse, the assistant vice principal found rolling papers and
marijuana.73 After conducting this warrantless search and discovering the
62

See id. at 333.
Id. at 340–41.
64
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
65
Id. at 838.
66
Id. at 829, 836–38.
67
Id. at 829–30 (internal citations omitted).
68
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370–71 (2009).
69
Nance, supra note 10, at 937.
70
Id. at 937–38; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 838 (“Within the limits of the Fourth
Amendment, local school boards must assess the desirability of drug testing
schoolchildren.”); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Video
surveillance does not itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Hough v.
Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D. Minn. 2009) (“An otherwise valid
administrative search—for instance, a search for weapons with a metal detector—will not
necessarily become invalid just because the results of the search are turned over to the
police.”); State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003) (upholding the search of a
student’s locker).
71
Nance, supra note 10, at 937–38.
72
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
73
Id.
63
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marijuana, the assistant vice principal notified and turned the evidence over to the
police.74 The State brought criminal charges against the student, and while the
student protested that the evidence was obtained through an unreasonable search,
the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the search as reasonable.75
In addition to weakened Fourth Amendment rights, courts have also
weakened students’ Fifth Amendment protections. For example, courts
“consistently hold that a school official may question a student without providing
Miranda warnings, regardless of the possibility that the school official might later
refer that student to law enforcement for wrongdoing.”76 The logical consequence
of weakening students’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections is that school
officials will be more likely to discover incriminating evidence because students
will be more likely to “fess up” without knowing that mandatory reporting
requirements77 will require school officials to report incriminating evidence to law
enforcement. This evidence will be provided to prosecutors, even though it was
“obtained under circumstances that would render such evidence inadmissible if
seized from an adult or a juvenile outside of the school context.”78 Rather than
protecting students, and setting them up to succeed, weakening their Fourth and
Fifth Amendment rights pushes more students into the STPP, where they are set up
to fail.79
(d) In Loco Parentis, Qualified Immunity, and Mandatory Reporting
While the rights of students in public schools have been restricted, teachers
and administrators have been given broader in loco parentis roles,80 and are often
granted qualified immunity when sued by students for constitutional violations.81
74

Id. at 328–29.
Id. at 329, 347.
76
Nance, supra note 10, at 938.
77
See id. at 934–36.
78
Id. at 939.
79
Id.
80
See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(explaining that the common law doctrine of in loco parentis, which weakens a student’s
privacy rights, enables a public school to “adequately . . . carry out its responsibilities” of
safety); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1995) (explaining that the
State’s power over students in public schools was “custodial and tutelary, permitting a
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”); see also 1
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *453 (1753) (explaining that
a parent can “delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or
schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the power
of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be
necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.”).
81
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009) (“A school
official searching a student is entitled to qualified immunity where clearly established law
does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
75
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These legal protections for teachers and administrators dealing with safety and
discipline enable them to discover zero tolerance and criminal violations by
students.82 Once aware of criminal violations, some mandatory reporting statutes
require teachers and administrators to turn the student in to the SRO stationed at
the school, or to local police.83 The cumulative effect of weakening students’
rights, strengthening teachers’ and administrators’ disciplinary authority, and
stripping teachers and administrators of discretion with zero tolerance policies and
mandatory reporting statutes funnels more students into the STPP.84
Two Supreme Court cases held that teachers and administrators hold in loco
parentis roles at school. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,85 the court held
that schools’ in loco parentis role expanded their powers to supervise and control
students in a way that “could not be exercised over free adults.”86 Relying on their
reasoning in Vernonia, the Supreme Court in Earls held that schools’ in loco
parentis powers gave them power “adequately to carry out [their] responsibilities”
of safety, thereby diminishing student’s privacy rights.87 These cases contributed to
a regime in schools that grants school officials in loco parentis rights that value
safety and discipline over students’ rights. Similar to the parens patriae power of
state actors to care for “persons under a legal disability . . . who cannot take care of
themselves,”88 this broadly paternalistic in loco parentis power can produce bias
and abuse when unchecked by rights.89
Additionally, the promise of qualified immunity for teachers and
administrators minimizes whatever deterrent effect the threat of civil suits poses. In
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,90 a school official conducted a
strip search on a thirteen-year-old girl who was suspected of possessing pills that
were prohibited under a zero tolerance policy.91 Even though the court found the
search unreasonable, the Redding court found the school official was entitled to
qualified immunity because the thirteen-year-old student’s right to be free from a
82

See id. at 371, 377–79 (holding that a school official was entitled to qualified
immunity even though he conducted an unreasonable search on a student to discover
whether she had violated one of the school’s zero tolerance prohibitions); Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 650–51, 654–55 (explaining that the school’s in loco parentis role contributed to the
holding that the school’s urinalysis test designed to test the presence of illegal drugs was
reasonable).
83
See Nance, supra note 10, at 934–36 (describing state mandatory reporting statutes
that require school officials to report criminal acts).
84
See id. at 929–45.
85
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
86
Id. at 654–55.
87
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
88
Coupet, supra note 21, at 1308 (citations omitted).
89
See Henning, supra note 21, at 426–30; cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967)
(“[U]nbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute
for principle and procedure.”).
90
557 U.S. 364 (2009).
91
Id. at 371, 374–75.
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strip search was not “clearly established” at the time.92 In addition to the protection
of qualified immunity afforded school officials, many states have statues creating
immunity for school officials who report “offenses to law enforcement in good
faith.”93
Federal and statewide mandatory reporting laws require teachers and
administrators to report criminal activity observed within the school.94 Under the
Gun-Free Schools Act, “virtually every school district [in the nation] is required to
have a policy in place that compels school officials to refer students who bring
weapons to school to law enforcement.”95 On a statewide level, “twenty-six states
require school officials to refer students to law enforcement for incidents relating
to controlled substances, fifteen states require referral for offenses involving
alcohol, eight states mandate referral for theft, nine states for vandalism of school
property, and eleven states for robbery without using a weapon.”96 Depending on
the violation, many states impose a criminal penalty on school officials for not
reporting, and provide immunity for school officials when they do report.97
Coupled with the promise of qualified immunity, teachers’ and
administrators’ in loco parentis rights empower them with broad disciplinary
authority over students. With broader authority to investigate than prosecutors or
police officers outside the academic environment, and with weaker due process
and privacy protections for students, teachers and administrators are more likely to
discover zero tolerance violations or criminal activity that they are likely to be
statutorily required to report. This imbalance of power, unequal distribution of
rights, and stripping of disciplinary discretion fuels the STPP.
2. Policing the Schools with School Resource Officers
Although very few studies demonstrate whether SROs make schools safer, the
presence of law enforcement in schools has risen from a few hundred nationwide
in the 1970s to over 19,000 in 2007.98 SROs were placed in schools to make them
safer, yet studies suggest that their presence in schools has contributed instead to

92

Id. at 377–79.
Nance, supra note 10, at 936.
94
See id. at 934–36.
95
Id. at 934; see 20 U.S.C. § 7961(h)(1) (2015) (“No funds shall be made available
under any subchapter of this chapter to any local educational agency unless such agency
has a policy requiring referral to the criminal justice or juvenile delinquency system of any
student who brings a firearm or weapon to a school served by such agency.”).
96
Nance, supra note 10, at 935.
97
Id. at 935–36.
98
Id. at 946–48; see also Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability,
and the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 157–59 (2015)
(discussing the influx of School Resource Officers, the reasons for the trend, and the mixed
results as to whether SROs increase school safety).
93
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the overcriminalization of students’ misbehavior, thereby fueling the STPP.99
Three factors contribute to this phenomenon: the implicit bias of decisionmakers
with discretionary powers,100 insufficient training of SROs,101 and the misuse of
SROs for resolving noncriminal behavioral problems.102
(a) Implicit Bias in Discretionary Arrests
One of the most alarming characteristics of the STPP is the disproportionate
rate at which students of color, students with disabilities, and LGBTQ students are
disciplined or referred to law enforcement by school officials for discretionary
violations.103 Once referred to law enforcement, students from these groups are
more likely to be criminalized.104 Researchers point to implicit bias as one of the
unintended but primary factors causing this disproportionality.105 Studies
demonstrate how “[r]ace plays a role in SROs’ perceptions of situations involving
youth and can influence split-second decisions related to culpability and whether
an arrest is necessary.”106 In this sense, race likely plays a role in teachers’, school
administrators’, and SROs’ decisions to either penalize a student who “violated a
discretionary law,” or just “give a warning.”107 Since “[m]any—if not most—of the
critical decisions impacting young people along the educational pipeline are
discretionary individual decisions,” implicit bias is one of the major contributing
factors to the differential treatment of students.108

99

REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 51–54; Nance, supra note 10, at 945–52;
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 157–59.
100
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54; Nance, supra note 10, at 942–43;
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 169.
101
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54; Nance, supra note 10, at 950–51;
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 161–63.
102
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 53–54; Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50;
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 164, 168.
103
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54–55; see also Merkwae, supra note 98, at
168 (explaining that “SRO discretion in deciding whether to make an arrest” may be a
cause of the trend that “students of color and students with disabilities bear a
disproportionate risk for being criminalized at school”); FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at
1–5 (finding that a lack of criteria for guiding discretionary decisions lead to disparate
outcomes for youth along racial and geographical lines).
104
See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 27, 30–31, 37, 39, 41–47; FINAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 1–5; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 168–72.
105
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 54–55.
106
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 169.
107
Id.; see also id. at 54 (explaining that minority students are “disproportionately
affected”).
108
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 55; see also Melinda D. Anderson, When
School Feels Like Prison, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/
education/archive/2016/09/when-school-feels-like-prison/499556/ [https://perma.cc/4DZNGAQM] (explaining a study that demonstrates how “campuses with larger populations of
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(b) Training School Resource Officers
While SROs are injected into schools with the hope that they will make the
schools safer, few SROs are provided with training on how to work with youth.109
Although the National Association of School Resource Officers (“NASRO”), a
nonprofit founded in 1991, offers and encourages SRO-specific training,110 very
few jurisdictions require the SROs in their schools to attend such training.111 In
2015, only twelve states had laws requiring SROs to have training; however, the
training requirements are inconsistent across the twelve states.112 Although
“[s]ome states mandate training on how to respond to an active shooter,” few focus
on “dealing with children differently than adults.”113 Furthermore, in 2012, “most
police academies d[id] not teach recruits about research on adolescent psychology
and behavior.”114 According to the United States Department of Justice, the lack of
substantive SRO training on child psychology, de-escalation, and children with
disabilities contributes to the STPP and may give rise to valid civil rights claims.115
Proponents of SRO training suggest that the training should emphasize
teaching SROs that their role is safety not discipline,116 de-escalation techniques if
they get involved in safety issues,117 how to specifically work with children,118 and
how to work with students who have disabilities.119 Without this training, SROs’
decisions “to arrest a student” are more likely to be “based on criteria that are
wholly distinct from and even anathema to the best interests of the student or the
school as a whole.”120

students of color are more likely to use harsh surveillance techniques,” sending a message
to students that “white children have greater privacy rights than nonwhite children.”).
109
Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–63.
110
About NASRO, NASRO, https://nasro.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/LHF7-BB9A]
(last visited July 26, 2017).
111
Mark Keierleber, Why So Few School Cops Are Trained to Work with Kids, THE
ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/11/why-domost-school-cops-have-no-student-training-requirements/414286/ [https://perma.cc/LT2ABLLR].
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Statement of Interest of the United States at 11–12, 14–15, S.R. v. Kenton Cty.,
(No. 2:15-CV-143), 2015 WL 10058699 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 2, 2015).
116
Keierleber, supra note 111.
117
Id.
118
Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50.
119
Keierleber, supra note 111.
120
Nance, supra note 10, at 951.
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(c) Blurred Lines: Using School Resource Officers for Discipline, Not
Safety
SROs were injected into the nation’s public schools in an effort to ensure that
our schools remained safe.121 Since most of these SROs were not provided with
SRO-specific training and few had clearly defined roles within their schools,122
SROs came to be used as disciplinarians by teachers and school administrators.123
The lines between what was a disciplinary issue and what was a safety or a
criminal issue became blurred.124 The practical effect of flooding our schools with
untrained and unhinged SROs was the over criminalization of student behavior, the
STPP.125
The U.S. Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department yields insight into this phenomenon:
SROs told us that they viewed increased arrests in the schools as a
positive result of their work. This perspective suggests a failure of
training (including training in mental health, counseling, and the
development of the teenage brain); a lack of priority given to deescalation and conflict resolution; and insufficient appreciation for the
negative educational and long-term outcomes that can result from
treating disciplinary concerns as crimes and using force on students.126
Absent job descriptions that “clearly define the SROs’ role or limit SRO
involvement in cases of routine discipline or classroom management,”127 SROs
became more likely to intervene when they observed students “being disruptive
and disorderly . . . because they view this as one of their duties, even when those
duties overlap with the traditional duties of school officials.”128 When it is unclear
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Merkwae, supra note 98, at 163.
See Keierleber, supra note 111, at 3–5; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64.
123
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 37 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F9WX-UEN9] (finding that the Ferguson Missouri Police treated “routine discipline issues
as criminal matters”) [hereinafter DOJ, FERGUSON].
124
See id.; Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64 (explaining that “when sworn police
officers are provided with unique access to students and are given disciplinary authority by
school administrators, it is not always clear where administrators’ disciplinary roles stop
and police powers begin.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125
See DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 38; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at
51–54.
126
DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 38.
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Id. at 37.
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Nance, supra note 10, at 949–50.
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“where administrators’ disciplinary roles stop and police powers begin,”129 benign
student behavior is more likely to be criminalized.130
The broad power of SROs to criminalize behavior, the automatic suspension
or expulsion with zero tolerance policies, the mandatory reporting statutes, and the
protections afforded school administrators greatly overpower the weakened rights
protecting students. This imbalance of power is at the root of the STPP. If schools
must inject SROs into the academic setting, automatically suspend or expel
students for zero tolerance violations, require school officials to discover and
report criminal violations, and weaken students’ constitutional rights, then they
need to reconsider their methods of punishment and reeducate those in charge of
punishment. These are two easy steps schools can take to minimize the effect the
STPP has on our nation’s children.
B. Utah’s Attempt at Juvenile Justice Reform
The major contributing factors to the STPP outlined in this Note are zero
tolerance policies,131 the limited constitutional rights of students,132 the police
power of school administrators,133 and the injection of SROs into the academic
environment without clear job responsibilities and training.134 To address the
causes and effects of the STPP, researchers focusing on this problem have
recommended: expanding the legal protections for juveniles;135 refraining from
using SROs for disciplinary issues;136 clearly distinguishing educator and
administrator disciplinary responsibilities from SRO responsibilities;137 retraining
SROs to better understand the effects of the STPP on youth and how to work with
youth populations, minority populations, students with disabilities, and LGBTQ
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Merkwae, supra note 98, at 162–64.
See DOJ, FERGUSON, supra note 123, at 37; Statement of Interest of the United
States at 11, S.R. v. Kenton Cty., (No. 2:15-CV-143), 2015 WL 10058699 (E.D. Ky. Oct.
2, 2015); cf. DEAR COLLEAGUE, supra note 42 (recommending training and professional
development for all school personnel, the appropriate use of school resource officers, and
the use of restorative justice practices).
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See supra Part A.1.(a).
132
See supra Part A.1.(b)–(c).
133
See supra Part A.1.(d).
134
See supra Part A.2.
135
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 15; Fox, supra note 16, at 1236 (arguing that
there will be no revolution in juvenile justice until juveniles are granted the right to
counsel); REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12; Developments in the Law, supra note
16, at 1763–69 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment protections afforded students should
be modified); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1967) (“Juvenile Court history has again
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a
poor substitute for principle and procedure.”).
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See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 4, 20; JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note
17, at 31; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.
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See REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6.
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students;138 adopting restorative justice practices along with other evidence based
alternatives to the juvenile justice system;139 and reforming the discretionary power
of state actors to cite, refer, and sentence youth within the juvenile justice
system.140
Over the last two years, Utah has attempted to implement some of these
recommendations by passing three new laws that regulate SROs, expand the legal
protections afforded juveniles, and guide the exercise of discretion throughout the
juvenile justice system. While these reforms make important steps in addressing
Utah’s STPP, they do not eliminate the potential for the bias and abuse of
discretion that contribute to, and the disparate outcomes manifested in, Utah’s
STPP.
1. Utah’s School Resource Officers Law
In June of 2014, Dr. Moises Prospero submitted the DMC Evidence-Based,
Best Practices Intervention Report (Intervention Report) to the Utah Board of
Juvenile Justice Disproportionate Minority Contact Subcommittee (“DMC
subcommittee”).141 Utah’s DMC subcommittee is “tasked with addressing the
overrepresentation of minority youth in the juvenile justice system” and aims “to
eliminate the disproportionate representation of minority youth at all points of
contact in the juvenile justice system.”142 Prospero’s Intervention Report
recommended creating written agreements between SROs and school districts that
outlined SRO responsibilities, the development of SRO-specific training programs,
and the use of diversion programs; or alternatives to the juvenile justice system,
like peer courts.143 Two years later, Sandra Hollins, the first African American
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See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 20–21; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 9;
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 17, at 32; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7;
REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 12–13.
139
See ALBERS ET AL., supra note 11, at 6, 22; FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–
13; PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at 13. For a
discussion on restorative justice, see infra Part B.2.(a).
140
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 12–21; REDFIELD & NANCE, supra note 8, at
13. See generally Coupet, supra note 21, at 1341–46 (arguing for guiding discretion
towards the use of individualized, restorative justice based, justice for youth offenders);
Henning, supra note 21, at 436–61 (arguing that reforming prosecutorial decision-making
in the juvenile justice system could reduce the racial disparities in the juvenile justice
system).
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PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 1.
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UTAH BOARD JUVENILE JUST.,
https://justice.utah.gov/Juvenile/ubjj_dmc.html [https://perma.cc/U286-KXDS] (last visited
July 26, 2017). The Utah Board of Juvenile Justice is a wing of the Utah Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice. Id.
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PROSPERO, supra note 18, at 6–7.
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woman to be elected to the Utah State Legislature,144 sponsored the “School
Resource Officers” bill (“SRO Law”) that included Prospero’s recommendations
when it was signed into law on March 22, 2016.145
(a) Training School Resource Officers
The “School Resource Officer” training section of the SRO Law requires the
State Board of Education to create and “make available a training program for
school principals and school resource officers.”146 In creating the training program,
the State Board of Education is required to “work in conjunction with the State
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice . . . solicit input from local school
boards . . . and consider the current United States Department of Education
recommendations on school discipline and the role of a school resource officer.”147
The law also includes recommended topics for the training, but does not make any
of the topics mandatory. Among the suggested topics are: training on childhood
development; how to appropriately respond to students and disabled students; deescalation and conflict resolution techniques; cultural awareness; restorative justice
practices; identifying whether a student has been exposed to trauma and how to
make appropriate referrals for that student; student privacy rights; the negative
consequences associated with injecting youth into the juvenile and criminal justice
system; strategies to reduce youth involvement in the justice system; and the
distinctions between the roles and responsibilities of SROs and school
administrators.148
(b) Defining School Resource Officers’ Responsibilities
The section of the “School Resource Officers” law that discusses the
contractual relationship between law enforcement agencies and local education
agencies requires the contract to include provisions that will help minimize the
misuse of SROs.149 Under this law, contracts between law enforcement agencies
and local education agencies must include language that requires SROs to
“emphasize the use of restorative approaches to address negative behavior.”150 The
contract must also describe the responsibilities of the SROs and the school
administrators to “maintain safe schools . . . and support educational opportunities

144

Lee Davidson, Black Politicians Beat Odds in Utah, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 5,
2015),
http://www.sltrib.com/news/2021834-155/black-politicians-beat-odds-in-utah
[https://perma.cc/8YRD-4VH6].
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H.B. 460, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016); see UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-111601, 1602, 1603, 1604 (2016).
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1603 (2016).
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for students.”151 The contract shall include detailed language designating the
“student offenses that the SRO shall confer with” school administrators to resolve,
including offenses that are “administrative issues that an SRO shall refer to a
school administrator for resolution.”152 The law mandates that contracts must
contain “a detailed description of the rights of a student under state and federal
law,” regarding searches, questioning, and privacy.153 Finally, contracts must
include “training requirements,” and one of those requirements is that the SRO and
the school principal “jointly complete the SRO training” designed by the State
Board of Education.154
(c) Utah’s SRO Law Addresses the Misuse of SROs and the Abuse of
Student Rights
If implemented successfully, the SRO Law could address the causes of Utah’s
STPP in five ways. First, by requiring SROs and school principals to attend the
SRO training together,155 the SRO Law creates a critical dialogue between law
enforcement agencies and local education agencies about how SROs should be
used, how they can be used, and where the line is between an SRO’s and a school
administrator’s responsibilities. Until the SRO Law was enacted, this was not done
on a broad scale in Utah.156 While this dialogue is an important first step towards
reforming how students are disciplined at school—the entry point to the STPP—
the effectiveness of this dialogue will depend on the trainer, the SROs, and the
school administrators in attendance.
Second, although the SRO Law does not mandate any of the training topics it
lists, it does limit the range of SRO training topics to the list it provides.157 These
topics could enable SROs to mitigate the effects of the STPP on students in their
schools. For example, learning how the adolescent mind works, how to respond
age appropriately to students, how to work with disabled students, or what is
considered normal behavior in different cultural contexts would aid an SRO in
differentiating between behavioral and criminal issues.158 Learning de-escalation
and conflict resolution techniques could help an SRO to prevent minor infractions
from becoming major criminal violations. Learning about restorative justice
practices could enable SROs to divert students from the juvenile justice system
when they committed minor infractions at school.159 Furthermore, learning about
151

Id.
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the long-term negative consequences associated with youth involvement in the
juvenile justice system could encourage an SRO to consider how best to serve
youth before citing and referring a youth to the juvenile justice system.160
An SRO armed with the knowledge and insight from each of these topics
could address the bias and abuse of discretion that often cause students to be
funneled into the STPP. However, like the deferential “with all deliberate speed”
language from Brown II, the fact that the SRO Law’s training language is not
mandatory could be a shortcoming that permits those with local control to
undermine the purpose of the training program.161
Third, by requiring that law enforcement agencies and local education
agencies enter into a contract defining the roles and responsibilities of SROs and
school administrators, school administrators and SROs will be less likely to
exercise unnecessary police power over students. Instead, when a school
administrator or an SRO believes a student’s behavior has risen to the level of
criminal, the SRO and the school administrator can confer to determine who
should take responsibility. If they disagree, or they do not know, they can reference
their contract. If implemented properly, the practical effect of having a contract
that clearly defines where SROs’ responsibilities begin and end could be that fewer
students are criminalized for benign behavioral missteps.162
Although this development is promising, any anticipated positive results
could be undermined by ambiguous or unenforced contracts between law
enforcement agencies and local education agencies. By granting local agencies the
discretion to create their own contracts, the SRO Law risks the possibility that
some communities may not work to combat the overcriminalization of adolescent
behavior.
Fourth, the SRO Law requires all contracts to include affirmative
requirements for SRO services.163 Under this section of the SRO Law, SROs are
required to collaborate with school administrators to solve problems and
emphasize the use of restorative, not punitive, practices for resolving negative
student behavior.164 Under the SRO Law, when a student violates a rule or a law,
SROs must try to resolve the problem with school administrators using restorative
practices.165 If implemented properly, problems would be dealt with in-house
before the student is referred to the juvenile justice system. This will divert
students from the juvenile justice system, causing fewer students to be funneled
into the STPP.
While this affirmative requirement in the SRO Law has the potential to
address abuse of discretion by way of resisting a change in SRO practices, it fails
to use carrots or sticks to incentivize compliance. Absent statutory incentives, like
160
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making SROs responsible for educational outcomes, these affirmative
requirements could go unenforced.
Finally, the SRO Law aims to protect students’ constitutional rights by
encouraging a student rights section in the SRO training, and requiring that the
contract between the law enforcement agency and the local education agency
include a detailed description of students’ state and federal rights. With a detailed
description of students’ rights in the SRO employment contract, SROs and school
administrators should no longer be unaware of what rights a student has. They
should know what procedures violate the student’s due process, privacy, and Fifth
Amendment rights. If an established right is clearly defined in the contract, yet the
SRO or the school administrator violates this right, it is possible that neither will
have a valid claim for qualified immunity.166
This section of the SRO Law has the potential to deter honest state actors
against grossly violating students’ rights. However, the SRO Law creates no
affirmative right for students to know what their rights are, or to enforce those
rights. Absent these affirmative educational and process rights for students, this
section of the bill fails to alter the balance of power between school officials
(including SROs) and students. Instead, this section of the bill relies on the
benevolence of school officials to act in students’ best interests.
2. Utah’s Juvenile Defense Law and Juvenile Justice Amendments
On June 16, 2016, Utah’s Governor, Senate President, House Speaker, and
Supreme Court Chief Justice “announced the formation of the interbranch Utah
Juvenile Justice Working Group [to] conduct a data-driven examination of Utah’s
juvenile justice system and issue a comprehensive set of policy recommendations”
with the goals of “protecting public safety, holding youth accountable, containing
costs, and improving outcomes for youth, families, and communities.”167 After
months of “exhaustive review of quantitative information from Utah’s courts and
juvenile corrections system” as well as “more than 30 roundtable discussions” with
key stakeholders in the juvenile justice system, the Utah Juvenile Justice Working
Group (“Working Group”) published its report in November, 2016.168
The Working Group made four key findings relating directly to the STPP.169
First, the Working Group found that a “lack of statewide standards leads to
inconsistent responses and disparate outcomes throughout the juvenile justice
system.”170 The “disparities based upon race and geography . . . for youth with
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similar offenses at every stage of the system” indicate that sentencing officers’
discretion produced biased results.171
Second, “[a]ffordable, accessible services that effectively hold youth
accountable and keep families intact are largely unavailable to the courts across the
state.”172 While data shows that “early intervention, substance abuse treatment, and
family services are in place and working effectively” in some districts, “the
scarcity of services in the communit[ies] often leads to decisions that send lowerlevel youth deeper into the justice system.”173
Third, while detaining juveniles “costs up to 17 times more than community
supervision,” it “results in similar rates of re-offending.”174 State actors frequently
used their discretion to send juveniles to punitive detention programs that were
more expensive and more likely to increase the risk of recidivism than alternatives
to detention.175 These findings demonstrate that the discretionary powers of state
actors were not always used in the child’s, the families’, the community’s, or the
state’s best interests. Absent clear guidelines to guide state actors’ decisions and
evidence-based diversion programs to serve juveniles, the power of discretion has
been used to place juveniles in ineffective, expensive, and punitive programs.
Finally, the Working Group found that “[m]ost youth do not receive legal
representation throughout the duration of the court process, even when their liberty
is at stake.”176 Without a legal advocate to demand the “constitutional
domestication”177 of the juvenile courts, the parens patriae power of the state is left
unchecked, and the fate of juveniles is in the hands of police officers, prosecutors,
probation officers, and juvenile court judges.178 The Working Group’s findings
indicate that Utah state actors have not always used their discretion in juveniles’
best interests, and most juveniles have had no legal representation to protect their
constitutional rights and advocate for their best interests.179
(a) Protecting the Constitutional Rights of Juveniles
In response to the Working Group’s findings, the Utah State Legislature
passed S.B. 134, Indigent Defense Commission Amendments,180 during Utah’s
2017 legislative session. The Indigent Defense Commission Amendments
171
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(“Juvenile Defense Law”), hints at expanding the constitutional protections
afforded juveniles in Utah by suggesting that counsel should be provided “at all
stages” for “[i]ndigent parties in juvenile delinquency and child welfare
proceedings.”181 While the Juvenile Defense Law does not directly provide for
Parcounsel at all stages for indigent youth, or address how to keep students outside
of the STPP, the law takes a baby step towards protecting the constitutional rights
of students once they have been funneled into the STPP by recognizing the
importance of counsel. However, as some have argued, “[t]he granting of
procedural rights can hardly become a reality for children without lawyers to assert
them on their behalf.”182 Without advocates to protect the rights of indigent youth,
those youth will be more vulnerable to the bias and abuse of discretion that
contribute to the disparate outcomes in Utah’s STPP.183
(b) Reforming the Discretionary Powers of State Actors
Responding to the Working Group’s findings, the Utah State Legislature also
passed H.B. 239, Juvenile Justice Amendments (the “Amendments”) during the
2017 legislative session.184 In large part, the Amendments address the misuse of
parens patriae power in Utah by guiding discretion using standards and procedures,
the limitation of punitive options, and the expansion of evidence-based
rehabilitative services.185
First, the Amendments reformed how certain conduct was reported by
narrowing what conduct could be reported to law enforcement, by expanding what
offenses qualified for school-based interventions, and by requiring that minor
school-based offenses were reported only to school-based diversion programs.186
Second, the Amendments changed public school discipline policies by declaring
when schools must refer minor school-based offenses to diversion programs.187
These two changes should address the overcriminalization of adolescent
behavior, and thereby diminish the flow of students into the STPP. Taking law
enforcement officers out of the equation for school-based offenses makes sense
from a rehabilitative standpoint. Law enforcement officers have training in
identifying criminal behavior and addressing that behavior with punitive models.
Despite the SRO Law, SROs throughout the state do not yet have training in child
developmental psychology and addressing adolescent behavior with rehabilitative

181

Id.; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-804(1)(iv)(B) (2017).
Fox, supra note 16, at 1236.
183
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 2, 11–12.
184
H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017).
185
Id.
186
Id.; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-603 (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-101.7
(2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-911 (2017).
187
See H.B. 239, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-910
(2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-105 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-908 (2010);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-901 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-911 (2017).
182

1084

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

techniques.188 Public school employees and school-based diversion programs do
have this training. Placing a stronger burden on school officials and school-based
diversion programs to use rehabilitative approaches in response to disruptive
behavior addresses one of the primary causes of the STPP, the overcriminalization
of adolescent behavior.
Third, the Amendments limit the power of schools and juvenile courts to
punish juveniles for “disruptive student behavior,” modifies the notice provisions
for disruptive student behavior, and requires schools to use school-based problem
solving interventions for disruptive behavior.189 This change limits the power of
schools and juvenile courts to punish students for the vague offense of “disruptive
student behavior.” By forcing schools to refer these offenses to problem solving
diversion programs, this change addresses another cause of the STPP—zerotolerance-like catchall offenses—thereby increasing the likelihood that students
will receive affordable rehabilitative treatment.
Fourth, the Amendments removed the limitation that minors can only receive
rehabilitative dispositions if it is their first violation of alcohol, drug paraphernalia,
controlled substances, or prohibited acts charges.190 At most, this is a change in
judicial discretion. While this change does not significantly narrow the state’s
discretionary powers to punish youth for drug-related offenses, it does expand the
state’s discretionary powers to give juveniles rehabilitative dispositions for those
offenses.
Fifth, the Amendments require Utah’s Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice (“CCJJ”) to study evidence-based community and diversion programs,
develop training and guidelines for those programs, and, along with the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services (“JJS”), expand their availability throughout the state.191
Although this reform will take time to implement, it has the potential to be a
crucial element of the Amendments. If the CCJJ can find evidence-based programs
that will effectively rehabilitate, rather than punish, juveniles, JJS could offer these
programs throughout the state. These programs would cost less, serve youth more
effectively, and divert many youths from the STPP.192 However, this reform will
be ineffective if the CCJJ does not find programs that work (i.e. programs that
rehabilitate juveniles without disparate outcomes), if local communities reject the
programs (i.e. abuse of discretion), or if JJS is not given the funding to implement
these programs (resulting in disparate outcomes based on geography).
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Sixth, the Amendments expand the criteria for when youth must be offered
nonjudicial adjustments (i.e. diversion programs), strips the requirement that
juveniles must admit guilt and waive their privilege against self-incrimination to
obtain a nonjudicial adjustment, prohibits denial of nonjudicial adjustments if the
juvenile cannot pay for the service, requires that fees adhere to a statewide sliding
scale, and permits prosecutors to dismiss cases where juveniles fail to meet the
conditions of their nonjudicial closure.193
By expanding the requirements for offering nonjudicial adjustments with
statutory criteria and a sliding scale for fees, the Amendments increase the
likelihood that youth will receive rehabilitative dispositions. Additionally,
eliminating the requirement that youth admit guilt and waive their privilege against
self-incrimination before participating in a diversion program is one of the few
ways the Amendments protect the constitutional rights of juveniles.
Finally, the Amendments enable school boards to create and partner with
certified youth court programs, permit referrals to youth courts for minor schoolbased offenses, permit youth courts to take on juveniles referred for multiple minor
offenses, and eliminate the requirement that juveniles waive their right to a speedy
trial and their right against self-incrimination to participate in the program.194
Protecting juveniles’ constitutional right to a speedy trial and privilege against
self-incrimination in youth courts is a positive step that limits the parens patriae
power of state actors in these diversion programs. Additionally, by enabling
partnerships between schools and youth courts, these reforms make way for the
proliferation of school-based restorative justice diversion programs throughout the
state. Coupled with the requirement that school-based offenses are referred to
diversion programs as well as the CCJJ’s mandate to study and expand the use of
evidence-based diversion programs, this reform paves the way for an institutional
shift in how Utah’s parens patriae power is administered in response to first time,
low-risk juvenile offenders. However, this reform is limited because it is
permissive rather than mandatory. If school boards and communities throughout
Utah decide not to create youth court diversion programs, this reform will have no
positive effect for the juveniles in those communities, resulting in no diversionprogram check on the bias and abuse of discretion associated with the STPP at the
school level, and causing disparate outcomes based on geography.
Utah’s Juvenile Justice Amendments, H.B. 239, made significant
improvements to the juvenile justice system by limiting and guiding state actors’
powers of discretion throughout the system. However, in large part, the reforms
either passed these powers of discretion to state actors with less punitive power
(i.e. public school officials or diversion programs), or permitted juvenile court
judges to exercise more discretion in deciding whether to send juveniles through
193
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diversion programs. These reforms do little to address the bias and abuse of
discretion that contribute to, and the disparate outcomes manifested in, Utah’s
STPP. However, Utah can address these problems by using its existing network of
youth courts to divert students from the STPP.
3. Utah’s Network of Restorative Justice Youth Courts
Originally passed in 1999, the Utah Youth Court Diversion Act (“Youth
Court Act”) defines the types of offenses that youth courts are permitted to hear,
outlines the referral process for youth court juvenile offenders, lays out parameters
for disposition options, creates a board responsible for certifying and evaluating
youth courts, and permits local public school boards to provide school credit to
students who volunteer in youth courts.195
The Youth Court Act permits youth courts to take the cases of youth offenders
who have committed “minor offenses,”196 which are defined as “any unlawful act
that is a status offense or would be a class B or C misdemeanor, infraction, or
violation.”197 Law enforcement personnel, school officials, prosecuting attorneys,
juvenile court officers, and parents can refer juveniles to youth courts as an
intervention aimed at preventing further juvenile delinquency.198 A youth court
cannot accept referrals if it is not certified by the Utah Youth Court Board.199 Once
a referral is made, the youth court coordinator must screen the case to determine if
it qualifies.200 Youth courts can exercise authority over youths who do have a
pending law violation with the juvenile courts if the juvenile courts and the
prosecuting attorney agree, or if the youth court offense is not a law violation.201
Youth courts can decline to accept a youth or terminate a youth for any reason, and
a youth or a youth’s parent or guardian can withdraw from youth court at any
time.202
Youth volunteers determine the youth court dispositions (i.e. “sentences”) for
each youth court. Acceptable dispositions include community service, educational
classes, counseling, treatment, reporting to the youth court, participating in
mentoring programs, participating as a volunteer with the youth court, letters of
apology, essays, and “any other dispositions considered appropriate by the youth
court and adult coordinator.”203
Supporting the Youth Court Act, The Utah Youth Court Association
(“UYCA”) is a collection of youth courts throughout the state of Utah. The UYCA
aims to train and educate youth court workers and volunteers, help establish
195
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restorative justice youth courts, collect statewide data, and promote the work of
youth courts throughout the state.204 In 2015, Utah had twenty-three certified youth
courts.205 Operating under the Youth Court Act, the UYCA’s youth courts can be
used as restorative justice alternatives to the juvenile justice system. In this sense,
Utah’s restorative justice youth courts can combat Utah’s STPP.
(a) Restorative Justice Youth Courts
Restorative justice aims to prevent future criminal activity through a process
that focuses on three stakeholders and three goals.206 The stakeholders are victims,
communities, and offenders; the goals are community protection, skill
development, and accountability.207 Restorative justice focuses on a process of
“repairing harm and rebuilding relationships . . . that involves stakeholders in an
active and respective way, while emphasizing the community’s role in problem
solving.”208 Many youth courts have adopted restorative justice models. The
National Association for Youth Courts reports “[t]he primary function of most
youth court programs is to determine a fair and restorative sentence or disposition
for the youth respondent.”209
Additionally, in The Impact of Teen Court on Young Offenders, the
researchers found that all the youth courts they evaluated had significantly lower
rates of recidivism (less than 9%) than juvenile courts.210 The authors of the study
concluded that effective youth courts could significantly lower the rate of
recidivism, or the “rate at which youth commit new offenses after teen court.”211
While practices varied significantly between the youth courts studied, the
researchers noted that “many [youth volunteers] are former defendants” and
positive peer pressure was “the one guiding idea behind all teen courts.”212
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(b) Weakening Utah’s School to Prison Pipeline with Restorative Justice
Youth Courts
Utah’s Youth Court Act sets up a framework for certified youth courts to
legally operate as restorative justice diversion programs for first time juvenile
offenders. With twenty-three certified youth courts throughout Utah enabled by the
Youth Court Act, and the UYCA, youth courts can and should be used to combat
Utah’s STPP. Utah’s youth courts can mitigate the effects of Utah’s racially biased
STPP by: (i) serving as a quality control check on biased schoolhouse discipline,
(ii) diverting students from juvenile court, and (iii) giving students a stake in the
process of dismantling Utah’s STPP.
(i) Youth Courts as Quality-Control Checks on Biased
Schoolhouse Discipline
Under the Utah Youth Court Act, any person can refer a youth to a youth
court for a minor first-time offense. This includes teachers, principals, and SROs.
When a referral is sent to a local youth court, the adult coordinator at the youth
court is required to screen all referrals to determine whether the youth qualifies for
their restorative justice program. Since these are restorative justice youth courts,
part of this screening process includes contacting the key stakeholders: the
referring officer at the school (community member), the parent or legal guardian of
the referred youth (offender’s family), the referred youth herself (offender), and
any victims.213 If the screening process reveals that there was no real offense, an
adult coordinator could declare the case unfit for youth court. The Youth Court Act
also states that “[y]outh courts may decline to accept a youth” for any reason.214
Since youth courts are required to screen referred youth and can reject referred
youth for any reason, youth courts have a unique power to act as a check on the
bias and abuse of discretion that contribute to the funneling of students into the
STPP.215
The UYCA collects statewide data on youth courts.216 Included in this data set
is demographic information of the referred youth as well as the identity of the
referring officer.217 If the UYCA and their member courts notice that certain
referring officers disproportionately refer students of color, students with
Peer Court’s 2010–2014 years and finding that the research suggested that students who
graduated from Salt Lake Peer Court were unlikely to recidivate to Utah’s juvenile court).
213
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214
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1203(8) (2017).
215
See supra text accompanying notes 80, 83–86.
216
See BYLAWS, supra note 204, at 2 (noting one of the objectives of the UYCA is
“[c]ollecting and compiling statewide statistics and survey data.”).
217
Data Collection Requirements Years 2015–2017, UTAH YOUTH COURT ASS’N,
http://www.utahyouthcourts.com/certification.html [https://perma.cc/Z72J-6GPD] (last
visited May 13, 2016).

2017]

UTAH’S SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE

1089

disabilities, or LGBTQ students, the youth courts could scrutinize the statistics in
the presence of the referring officer, decline further referrals from the referring
officer, or do their best to fully support and nurture students referred to them from
referring officers who disproportionately refer students from certain groups. In
these ways, youth courts can use the data they collect to address some causes of
Utah’s STPP.
(ii) Youth Courts as Effective Alternatives to Juvenile Court
The Utah Youth Court Act sets up youth courts as early intervention diversion
programs that serve as alternatives to juvenile court. When a first-time offender
commits a class B or C misdemeanor, she can ask to be referred to a youth court
program instead of juvenile court. Furthermore, under the Act, juvenile court
officers and prosecuting attorneys have the power to give a youth court authority
over a referred youth who is in juvenile court. Youth courts can address the
funneling of students from school directly to juvenile court by serving as a legal
alternative to juvenile court.
The Fingerpaint to Fingerprints study revealed that a disproportionate
amount of Pacific Islander and Black students were referred directly to law
enforcement in Utah.218 By using youth courts as a precursor to juvenile courts,
school officials and SROs can divert students from the STPP. The findings of The
Impact of Teen Court on Youth Offenders study demonstrate that well-run youth
courts have the potential to serve referred youth offenders better than juvenile
courts, thereby addressing the disparate outcomes manifested in the STPP.219
Youth courts can develop, rather than merely punish, referred youth by employing
positive peer pressure to encourage referred youth to take accountability for their
actions, develop new skills, and connect with the community.
With low rates of recidivism, youth courts likely serve youth who are accused
of violating certain low-level misdemeanors better than juvenile courts.220
Furthermore, youth courts cost much less than juvenile courts.221 Even if Utah’s
youth courts do not have significantly lower recidivism rates than Utah’s juvenile
courts, the youth courts can still mitigate the criminalization effect of the STPP
because they do not create criminal records for referred youth.222 As an alternative
218
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to juvenile courts, youth courts can ease the effects of the STPP by diverting
students from juvenile court, serving them better than juvenile court, and insulating
them from a criminal record.
(iii) Youth Courts Give Students Powerful Roles
By giving youth, the people targeted by the STPP, the power to actively
engage with the penal system, youth courts give students the power to challenge
the STPP.223 First, contrary to juvenile courts, youth courts give youth volunteers
the responsibility of creating restorative dispositions for their peers. When youth
volunteers believe that the “offense” committed by the referred youth is no offense
at all, or is simply excusable by circumstance, the youth volunteers could suggest
dismissal of the case or give the referred youth minimal disposition requirements.
When youth volunteers believe that the offense committed requires attention, they
have the unique power to support the referred youth with peer pressure and
restorative dispositions that focus on accountability, skill development, and
helping the referred youth connect with positive networks within the community.
Second, many youth courts are made up of youth volunteers who previously
appeared before the youth court as referred youth offenders.224 Former defendants
understand how to successfully navigate and use the restorative justice youth court
process. As youth who have made mistakes, former defendants have great potential
to connect with referred youth by telling their story and explaining how they
successfully completed youth court. Furthermore, if former defendants feel like
they were racially profiled or unfairly disciplined, they have the power to advocate
for their peers when they believe referred youth are unfairly before the court,
thereby addressing the disparate impacts of the STPP.
C. Expanding Juveniles’ Rights and Improving Parens Patriae Discretion
While discretion is often necessary and should not be wholly eliminated from
the juvenile justice system, Utah should adopt the following measures to
strengthen juveniles’ rights and guide the discretionary powers of state actors.
These changes should improve the balance of power between juveniles and state
actors, and mitigate the effects of the STPP on juveniles throughout the state.
First, Utah should guarantee counsel at all stages for indigent parties in
juvenile delinquency and child welfare proceedings. If Utah takes the
constitutional rights of its juveniles seriously, this is a necessary step. Utah cannot
overlook the results of its Working Group’s report, which exposes how bias and
abuse of discretion contribute to the funneling of students into the juvenile justice
that youth’s case file with juvenile court, after the youth has shared information in
confidence with the youth court may violate due process protections. Utah should consider
eliminating or changing this section of the Utah Youth Court Diversion Act.
223
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224
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system, and demonstrates that youth are subject to disparate outcomes once they
are in the juvenile justice system.225 Furthermore, the lasting negative effects of the
STPP on juveniles supports protecting their constitutional right to counsel; once a
youth has been funneled into the STPP, the cards are stacked against her for the
rest of her life.226 While appointing counsel to indigent youth defendants does not
directly prevent students from being funneled into the STPP, it does address what
happens to students once they are in the pipeline.
Second, Utah should grant juveniles a statutory right to evidence-based
rehabilitative treatment. If our juvenile justice system is based on the premise that
“juveniles are different” than adults because they are more amenable to
rehabilitation,227 then granting juveniles this right is the next logical step. The
evolution of America’s juvenile justice system, and the Working Group’s report,
has shown that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”228 Rather than relying on
the benevolence of its public school officials, its SROs, its probation officers, and
its juvenile court judges, Utah should empower juveniles with the right to hold the
state accountable to the principle of rehabilitation. Utah could do this by giving
juveniles a right to evidence-based rehabilitative treatment that is only lost if the
juvenile commits a heinous crime and has failed a graduated list of evidence-based
rehabilitative treatments.
Third, Utah should expand the Miranda rights of juveniles by creating a
statutory right to Miranda warnings in all school-based interrogations.229 To
further safeguard juveniles’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
Utah should require all public school personnel (including SROs) to consult with a
youth’s parent, legal guardian, or custodian before asking the youth about any
criminal violation above a class B misdemeanor (whether the youth is a suspect or
a witness). If Miranda rights are not read to the youth’s parent, legal guardian, or
custodian before any questioning begins, Utah courts should be instructed to
suppress all evidence obtained from the questioning.230 This broadened
constitutional protection would intentionally make criminal investigations against
juveniles in the school setting burdensome. Instead of pursuing criminal charges
against juveniles, it would be easier for school officials to pursue the rehabilitative
and restorative justice processes, or diversion programs already in place.231
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Fourth, Utah should pass legislation mandating that school boards throughout
the state offer a minimum of three evidence-based, CCJJ certified diversion
programs. For each program to be certified, it must meet standards adopted by the
CCJJ regarding the rehabilitative or restorative justice qualities of the program. To
assist the annual certification process, each program must submit annual reports to
the CCJJ that include referral data (i.e. who gets referred to the programs, who
does not, and for what offenses), and outcomes for each referred youth (i.e.
required dispositions, graduation data, behavioral changes). This reform would
hold diversion programs accountable to evidence-based standards and avoid the
drawbacks usually associated with granting broad discretion: bias, abuse of
discretion, and disparate outcomes.
Fifth, Utah’s State Office of Education and the CCJJ should partner in
researching and proposing a mandatory maximum class size throughout the state’s
public schools. Utah’s parens patriae and in loco parentis powers are most potent
in the public schools, where teachers oversee the education, socialization, and
development of our children. If large class sizes dilute the influence of our teachers
so they cannot fully support each student’s positive development, there should be
cause for concern. While it is important for Utah to invest in expanding its
rehabilitative processes on the back end—after juveniles have gone astray—it is
equally important to invest in preventative influence on the front end, before
juveniles go astray. This is especially true when the infrastructure to support
preventative counseling, K–12 public schools, is already in place.
II. CONCLUSION
Utah’s STTP problem needs to be resolved. Zero tolerance policies, the
limited constitutional rights of students, the police power of school administrators,
the injection of SROs into our schools without clear job responsibilities and
training, and the imbalance of power between students and state actors all
contribute to Utah’s biased STPP. To address the STPP, researchers encourage: the
expansion of legal protections for juveniles; the re-training of SROs and
employment contracts that clearly define SROs’ responsibilities; the use of
restorative justice practices and other evidence-based alternatives to the juvenile
justice system; and reforming the discretionary power of state actors to cite, refer,
and sentence youth within the juvenile justice system.
Utah’s new SRO Law, the Juvenile Defense Law, and the Amendments to the
discretionary power of state actors take important steps in addressing the causes
and the effects of the STPP. These reforms, however, are not enough. Utah should
expand the protections for juveniles by providing counsel at all stages for indigent
youth in juvenile delinquency and child welfare proceedings, by granting juveniles
the statutory right to evidence-based rehabilitative treatment, and by significantly
expanding their Miranda rights at school. Utah should improve how its actors
exercise discretion in shaping juveniles by enforcing evidence-driven standards for
the administration of its diversion programs, and by adopting a mandatory
maximum on class sizes in public schools throughout the state. Without these
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additional reforms, the discretionary authority of state actors will continue to
overpower juveniles’ weakened constitutional rights, leading to the bias and abuse
of discretion that cause, as well as the disparate outcomes that are manifested in,
Utah’s STPP.

